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Abstract
I would like to discuss the efforts that the United States has made to develop an effective
system of international law enforcement, and the difficulties which it has encountered in that pro-
cess. I will begin with a brief description of the tools which are available and can be employed in
international criminal procedure. I will then discuss how these tools have been applied to differ-
ent types of criminal activity. As I will explain, they have proved highly successful in the areas
of narcotics trafficking, organized crime, and money laundering, but have encountered significant
problems in the area of terrorism. These problems and the frustrations they have generated have
prompted the United States to attempt methods of self-help, such as seizures and military oper-
ations to apprehend terrorists abroad. I will conclude with some observations on the wisdom of
such remedies and the prospects for improved cooperation.
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International cooperation in law enforcement has as-
sumed an increasingly important role during the last decade.
The reason for this is simple. Just as developments in commu-
nications, transportation, and finance have increased interna-
tional commerce and tourism, they have also increased illicit
commerce and criminal exploitation of national boundaries.
Incidence of international crime, on an increasingly sophisti-
cated and organized level, has grown rapidly during the last
fifteen years and poses substantial problems for law enforce-
ment worldwide.
One lesson the United States has learned is that interna-
tional crime cannot be effectively fought from inside our bor-
ders. We have learned, for example, that we cannot effectively
combat narcotics trafficking without the cooperation and
assistance of all of those nations which are involved in the traf-
fic of narcotics, and the movement of cash proceeds derived
from their sale. The lesson of narcotics trafficking applies with
equal force to all other areas of international crime. Thus, it
has become commonplace to observe that cooperation in law
enforcement among nations is essential, particularly with those
types of crime which are international by nature, such as nar-
cotics trafficking, organized crime, money laundering, and ter-
rorism.
t This Address was presented at the Fordham University School of Law on
February 28, 1991. The Address was sponsored by the Fordham International Law
Journal and the Fordham International Law Students Association.
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nedy of the John F. Kennedy School of Government, who prepared case studies on
the Achille Lauro, Hamadei, and Yunis cases.
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I would like to discuss the efforts that the United States
has made to develop an effective system of international law
enforcement, and the difficulties which it has encountered in
that process. I will begin with a brief description of the tools
which are available and can be employed in international crimi-
nal procedure. I will then discuss how these tools have been
applied to different types of criminal activity. As I will explain,
they have proved highly successful in the areas of narcotics
trafficking, organized crime, and money laundering, but have
encountered significant problems in the area of terrorism.
These problems and the frustrations they have generated have
prompted the United States to attempt methods of self-help,
such as seizures and military operations to apprehend ter-
rorists abroad. I will conclude with some observations on the
wisdom of such remedies and the prospects for improved co-
operation.
Let me first describe the various legal and informal means
used in international cooperation in investigations and prose-
cutions. These tools include the use of extradition treaties and
conventions; the exchange of information, witnesses and evi-
dence, through mutual assistance treaties; the adoption of laws
with extra-territorial application; and perhaps most impor-
tantly, the establishment of channels for day-to-day informa-
tion exchanges and personal contacts.
. Narcotics and Organized Crime
When applied to international criminal activity, these
mechanisms have obtained very different results, as I previ-
ously mentioned. Let's start with the good news. In the last
ten years, U.S. efforts at combatting narcotics trafficking, or-
ganized crime activities, and related money laundering have
been significantly strengthened by joining forces with many
other countries which have common experience with these
problems. Today we share information on a daily basis with
law enforcement officers in many countries, and we have con-
ducted and are conducting joint investigations and prosecu-
tions leading to the interdiction and dismantling of numerous
international criminal cartels. Yet this is a very recent phe-
nomenon. Just ten years ago, it was extremely difficult to con-
duct investigations that reached outside the United States.
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The problems included: a lack of trust on both sides as to what
use would be made of information provided; extremely slow
mechanisms permitting the exchange of information between
countries; and substantial limitations on the use of any infor-
mation which ultimately arrived.
In the late 1970s and early 1980s, the United States nego-
tiated new treaties with a number of countries and worked to-
ward a U.N. convention on narcotics trafficking.' The objec-
tive of entering into these new treaties was to streamline the
process of information exchange and extradition, and to re-
duce technical barriers to the exchange of witnesses and data
that were needed for joint investigations and prosecutions.
While that process was in progress, the United States also es-
tablished and encouraged programs which permitted U.S. law
enforcement agencies to meet with their counterparts and dis-
cuss common problems in the area of narcotics and organized
crime.
One such example is the United States-Italian Working
Group on Organized Crime and Narcotics, which later was ex-
panded to include terrorism as well.' Chaired by the U.S. At-
torney General and the Italian Minister of the Interior (Chief"
of Law Enforcement), this Group began to provide a forum for
discussion of law enforcement problems common to both
countries. Canada has recently been included in this Group,
which serves as a model for our relations with other countries.
The combination of these informal discussions and treaty ne-
gotiations formed the basis of a new willingness on the part of
the United States and its allies to work together.
Because of the new instruments-particularly mutual
assistance treaties-legal barriers to the exchange of investiga-
tive material, including grand jury information and informa-
tion collected by foreign authorities otherwise covered by the
secrecy of the investigating magistrate, were eliminated, and it
became possible to work together in ongoing cases. These
mutual assistance treaties are agreements that permit the jus-
tice departments of each nation to engage in direct exchanges,
1. On December 29, 1988, the U.N. Convention Against Illicit Traffic in Nar-
cotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances was opened for signature in Vienna.
2. This Group was formed in 1984 and added terrorism to its list of concerns in
1986. See U.S., Italy Sign Post to Jointly Fight Terrorism, L.A. Times, June 25, 1986, at
A8, col. 6.
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unlike the previous process of using Letters Rogatory,3 which
were sent to the court of another nation through diplomatic
channels, and then assigned by the court to a local prosecutor.
Letters Rogatory provided no chain of responsibility and took
at least six months to a year to obtain any response. Mutual
assistance requests go directly to the Justice Department,
which is responsible for their completion, and they can pro-
duce evidence in days. This new possibility of information ex-
change, in turn, led interested prosecutors and investigators
on both sides of the Atlantic to the quite logical conclusion
that two nations possessed more information collectively than
either had individually.
Thus, for example, in the case of the United States and
Italy, it became evident during the early 1980s that, through
exchanging information about certain organized crime and
narcotics groups, they could jointly develop proof of an inter-
national narcotics conspiracy which had been established and
operated for many years by U.S. and Sicilian mafia families.
That exchange of information led to cases such as the "Pizza
Connection," in which law enforcement officers in the United
States, Italy, Spain, Brazil, Switzerland, Canada, and Germany
all worked in concert for nearly a year, executed arrests of
more than a hundred individuals, and conducted an equal
number of searches on a single day.4 In that same case, two
Sicilian mafia members, Tommaso Buscetta and Salvatore
Contorno, cooperated with both U.S. and Italian authorities
and provided testimony in trials in both countries. 5 That joint
testimony tested the limits of each system, which have very dif-
ferent rules regarding immunity agreements, pre-trial disclo-
sure and cross-examination. Because of the new treaties and a
desire to work together, those differences were successfully
bridged, and a huge chain of organized crime-controlled nar-
cotics traffic was exposed and destroyed.
This new cooperation also made it possible for U.S. au-
thorities working with their allies to exchange information
3. See Hague Convention on the Taking of Evidence Abroad in Civil or Com-
mercial Matters, Mar. 18, 1970, 23 U.S.T. 2755, T.I.A.S. No. 7444, 847 U.N.T.S. 231.
4. United States v. Badalamenti, No. 84 Cr. 236 (PNL) (S.D.N.Y.).
5. See United States v. Badalamenti, 626 F. Supp. 658, 660 (S.D.N.Y. 1986) (dis-
cussing Contorno's testimony); United States v. Badalamenti, 626 F. Supp. 655, 658
(S.D.N.Y. 1986) (discussing Buscetta's testimony).
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obtained through electronic surveillance in their own coun-
tries, and to follow targets as they traveled throughout the
world with the active cooperation of other law enforcement au-
thorities. Similarly, it became possible to follow the flow of
monies outside the United States through other countries,
such as Switzerland, on to their ultimate recipients. That in-
formation had never been available before and, obviously, has
provided extremely important proof linking significant organ-
ized crime members and narcotics traffickers to criminal events
in other countries with which they otherwise would never be
associated. Cases like the "Pizza Connection," which were im-
portant in their time, have been dwarfed by subsequent investi-
gations where the United States has exchanged information on
a scale far greater and broader than could be imagined just a
few years ago. Plainly, the success of such cases has increased
the willingness of all those involved to continue their coopera-
tion and to enhance it.
In the area of money laundering, for example, the United
States has been successful in seizing narcotics and organized
crime profits in many countries, and has obtained cooperation
not only from Switzerland but many countries in Latin and
South America and others in Europe. Recently, the Trevi
Group has pressed for uniform money laundering laws to be
adopted by all the EEC nations.6 If this is done, as I believe it
will be, it will be possible to -exchange information on a daily
basis with those countries, which will enable each nation to
trace illegal money flows throughout the world. Such legisla-
tion would substantially impede the ability of narcotics traffick-
ers and organized crime members to launder proceeds and in-
vest them in international commerce-an ability which they
have until recently exercised without restraint.
While the successes I have described have been important,
it is clear that they have by no means eliminated narcotics traf-
ficking, organized crime, or the profits derived from those
crimes. In fact, it is possible to argue that the advances in law
enforcement have just kept pace with those of the criminal ele-
ment in the use of international commerce. Having said that,
6. The Trevi Group brings together the equivalent of the Justice Department in
all the nations of the European Community ("EC"). The Trevi Group is comprised
of the justice and interior ministers of the EC Member States.
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however, it is obvious that the need for such cooperation and
its continued growth is essential. The prospects for that
growth are good.
Terrorism
Let me now contrast the success of cooperative efforts in
those fields with the results achieved in the area of terrorism.
An initial problem affecting cooperation in terrorism cases
is that, although many nations have experienced terrorist inci-
dents, until the recent advent of state-sponsored terrorism
such crimes were routinely viewed as domestic or local
problems, arising out of local political unrest, or religious, or
racial divisions. Most often, therefore, such terrorism
problems were dealt with through local political and police
channels, and most countries have been quite resistant to
outside interest or participation in these matters, which are
often regarded as interference. That nationalist point of view
has continued to prevail, even against new and quite different
external threats such as state-sponsored terrorist groups and
evolved mercenary organizations like the Japanese Red Army.
Despite the presence of such terrorist organizations which
often carry out their actions in third countries, the response to
calls for unified international action has been slow and quite
limited. When the United States launched its program against
terrorism in 1981 and sought agreement that certain acts, such
as hijacking, bombing, hostage taking, and murder should be
viewed as criminal regardless of their alleged motivation or
justification, the effort was viewed with considerable suspicion,
and concern that the proposed program would result in an in-
trusion into domestic affairs.
While in the past several years, and in the face of ever
more "international" terrorism, some of the suspicion about
U.S. motives has abated, and a general consensus about par-
ticular criminal acts, such as murder and kidnapping, is emerg-
ing, there remains a strong interest on the part of each nation
to set its own foreign policy which often stands in the way of
greater cooperation. Plainly, each nation wants to preserve its
independence in its bilateral relations with other nations, and
no nation wants to be limited in its international dealings by
another state. Similarly, many nations, or more precisely, their
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governments, do not wish to be viewed as instruments of the
foreign policy of a more powerful country, like the United
States. Nor do they wish to take actions which may affect their
economy, or which make it more likely that their citizens will
be victims of terrorist acts.' These are simple realities which
must be understood in any effort to encourage support for in-
ternational cooperation against terrorism. What distinguishes
terrorism in this regard from organized crime and narcotics
trafficking, of course, is that, for the most part, those latter of-
fenses have no political supporters and no recognized political
movement behind them. Also, except for the recent example
of Colombia, most narcotics and organized crime groups pose
no direct challenge to governments. There is ordinarily no
profit in such tactics, and therefore, no motivation for such be-
havior for those criminal groups. Thus, at the outset, interna-
tional cooperation in the field of terrorism automatically raises
complex political questions which are generally absent from ef-
forts to combat organized crime and narcotics trafficking.
While this may well be stating the obvious, several addi-
tional considerations-which may be less apparent-emanate
from these points. The first such observation is that those who
speak on questions of terrorism represent different sections of
their government from those who speak about organized crime
and narcotics. Usually, foreign ministry representatives, some-
times together with intelligence officers and military person-
nel, dominate in delegations discussing terrorism or negotiat-
ing agreements in this area. Their counterparts from law en-
forcement, who lead similar discussions in the field of
organized crime and narcotics, are in the minority, if present at
all. More significantly, the decision making in terrorist cases is
almost always left to political, rather than law enforcement of-
ficers. The problem which inevitably results from such a divi-
sion of responsibility is that those most familiar with the day-
to-day realities of terrorist actions have little or no role in set-
ting governmental policy. Moreover, such knowledgeable offi-
cials are effectively deprived of a forum in which to meet and
exchange information and opinions with their colleagues from
other countries. The absence of such common meeting points
works a serious hardship on the process of cooperation, which
7. See supra notes 30-38 and accompanying text (discussing Hamadei case).
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requires precisely that common base of experience which the
police often have and foreign affairs officers lack, particularly
when they are assigned to cover terrorism only briefly, rather
than as a profession.
Because practical information is not exchanged, investiga-
tions suffer. Patterns of activity and common goals are simply
not generated and pursued when professional investigators are
not brought together and do not enjoy full access to data.
Greece, for example, has routinely refused to allow access to
most foreign representatives interested in gathering informa-
tion and evidence about terrorist bombings and shootings
which have occurred there. When that bar was lifted slightly,
those who were permitted access were not professional law en-
forcement agents, but intelligence agents, who have quite a
different expertise and very different chain of command.
As a related matter, it is quite common for responsibility
for terrorism matters to be relegated to intelligence services,
rather than "judicial" authorities-by that term I mean profes-
sional law enforcement agents and prosecutors who are
trained to obtain evidence which can be presented in court.
Intelligence officers are not trained to accumulate or store evi-
dence, and, instead of reporting their findings to a prosecutor
or court, most intelligence services report to defense or polit-
ical officers. Typically, the information they gather is not used
to pursue criminal violations, but to advise the executive on
how to act. Also typically, the information gathered by intelli-
gence services is not shared or even available to other nations,
should they request it. Rather, it is routinely classified as se-
cret and shielded from disclosure.
The question of which governmental agency or division is
responsible for conducting investigations in terrorism cases is
not merely a bureaucratic or technical issue. Instead, the re-
sponsibility for such activities is essential to the development
and preservation of evidence. In several recent cases, for ex-
ample, U.S. law enforcement authorities have been frustrated
by their inability to obtain physical evidence such as bombing
devices or debris, or hotel or car registration records, on which
fingerprints might appear. This information is obviously vital
in identifying those persons involved in terrorist acts. That in-
formation is not only useful in prosecution but in all other ef-
forts to combat terrorism. The problem often faced is that in-
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telligence or military agencies who arrive at the scene are not
trained in evidence collection or preservation, and, if not care-
fully handled or preserved, such evidence is easily destroyed.
Even when properly developed and retained, however, such in-
formation is not often shared when it is gathered by intelli-
gence rather than law enforcement authorities, whose objec-
tives are frequently quite different.
I must point out that the United States does not have a
perfect record in this regard either. While all terrorist events
occurring in the United States are the province of the Federal
Bureau of Investigation (the "FBI"), which reports .them to lo-
cal prosecutors for legal action with the exception of the new
extraterritorial statutes, incidents occurring outside the United
States are handled by the Central Intelligence Agency (the
"C.I.A."), the Regional Security Office of the U.S. Department
of State, or U.S. military investigators. Even in those cases
where the FBI has presumptive jurisdiction, as in the recent
killing of President Zia and the U.S. Ambassador in Pakistan,'
it has not easily been afforded the access it needs to conduct its
investigations. Resistance to FBI participation in the investiga-
tion of that case, and particularly in inspecting the "crime
scene," was a combined result of foreign and U.S. opposition.
This example illustrates how international cooperation re-
mains stymied even in a case where the U.S. is involved.
In the end, the ingrained political control over the subject
of terrorism permeates through all aspects of state responses,
and impedes the process of cooperation. The effects of that
process are equally evident in the different legal modes of in-
ternational cooperation.
MECHANISMS OF INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION
The same treaties and conventions on extraditions and
mutual assistance which are highly effective in narcotics and
organized crime cases have not been productive in terrorism
cases. While to some extent these problems are the result of
the previously described difficulties in political perspective and
personnel, these mechanisms unmistakably constitute the key
8. See Hazarika, Indians Send Regrets, While Wondering What It All Means, N.Y.
Times, Aug. 18, 1988, at A10, col. 1 (discussing reactions to President Zia's death).
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point in international law enforcement, and weakness at this
level leads to a systemic breakdown of enforcement.
The foremost problem is that affecting extradition. Obvi-
ously, when one nation has pursued criminal charges against a
terrorist who has committed an offense from, or fled to, an-
other nation, there is an expectation that its criminal process
will be honored. Just as clearly, when the extradition request
is not granted, both countries emerge from the process frus-
trated, and the level of cooperation between them diminishes.
Yet this is a likely result in terrorist cases, for several reasons.
First, there is no universally accepted formula for charging
terrorists. Indeed, there are so many different charges which
nations have adopted in their penal codes for prosecuting ter-
rorist acts that very often it is impossible to find the basis of
dual criminality.9 One of the clearest examples of this problem
arises in Italy, where terrorist conspiracies are charged as "as-
sociazione," a legal concept which makes it a crime to partici-
pate in a group seeking to destabilize the government, or
which commits acts against the state. This type of criminal
statute finds no parallel in the jurisprudence of most countries,
which are unable to match it with a similar national offense and
therefore decline to grant extradition. Over the past decade,
for example, France has denied the extradition of many ter-
rorists charged in Italy for precisely this reason. Since France
has (until quite recently) indicated no willingness to alter its
view in such cases, Italy's extradition requests were denied,
and France became a haven for Italian terrorists, particularly
Red Brigades members. Although there has been some recent
progress in the return of Italian terrorists from France, this
general problem remains.' °
9. Dual criminality is the requirement that both nations involved in the extradi-
tion treat the offense charged as a crime. This requirement is a feature of all extradi-
tion treaties and is necessary to initiate an extradition. See Caplan v. Vokes, 649 F.2d
1336 (9th Cir. 1981) (discussing requirement of dual criminality).
10. Italy and other nations with particular anti-terrorist statutes cannot reason-
ably attempt to draft the charges against a particular individual in such a way as to
satisfy the internal laws of another state. In most cases, prosecution for all offenses
committed is mandatory, and, even in those nations where there is some discretion,
there is no way to be certain where the terrorist will be when he is apprehended.
Moreover, if a terrorist is apprehended, the requesting state surely wants to be in the
position to use its best evidence and most effective sanctions to prosecute the individ-
ual. To relinquish these powers at the outset would be counter-productive, and
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Plainly, there is urgent need for harmonizing language or
legislation which would permit treaty partners and convention
participants to look to the underlying conduct charged. A re-
quested nation could then determine whether that conduct
constitutes a criminal offense under its law, and thereafter de-
cide whether the manner in which the requesting nation has
charged the offense, such as through "associazione," otherwise
violates its constitution. While such a view of dual criminality
would plainly assist in resolving that legal problem, there still
remains the political question.
The Political Offense Exception
In extradition cases, the political offense exception prob-
lem comes to the fore when all other aspects of the extradition
are met, but the defendant claims that he is being prosecuted
for a political offense. The political offense exception to extra-
dition is designed to protect individuals from abuse by barring
their return to countries where either the legal system is inher-
ently unfair, where they would be subject to racial or religious
discrimination, or where their act was merely one of political
expression or opposition." This exception, however, has been
applied by courts and governments in many situations outside
its intended range. In these cases it is difficult candidly to say
that the treaty is being applied, since the exception is so clearly
being used merely to insulate the requested state from having
to deny the extradition outright. Such actions diminish the re-
spect for treaties, and discourage international extradition.
Although it is unfortunately true that there are many ex-
amples of such applications of the political offense exception,
one recent case illustrates the issue clearly. In December
1988, Greece declined to extradite the Palestinian terrorist Al
Zumar to Italy.12 The Greek courts had ruled favorably on It-
aly's request to extradite Al Zumar, who had participated in the
bombing of a synagogue in Rome where dozens of people
could even result in the acquittal of the returned defendant, which creates future
problems with the requested country.
11. See Abramovsky, The Political Offense Exception and the Extradition Process: The
Enhancement of the Role of the U. S. Judiciary, 13 HASTINGS INT'L & CoMP. L. REV. 1 (Fall
1989).
12. See Parmelee, Italy, U.S. Denounce Release of Suspect: Arab Wanted for Terrorism
Freed by Greece, Wash. Post, Dec. 10, 1988, at A17.
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were injured and a child killed. Greece had notified Italy by
diplomatic note" that it was going to hold Al Zumar until the
sentence for the minor offense (passport violation) for which
he had been arrested in Greece was concluded. At that time,
Italy expected to receive Al Zumar. Instead, on the day his
sentence expired, the Greek Minister of Justice denied the ex-
tradition, stating that Al Zumar's action constituted legitimate
political expression, and the extradition was thus precluded by
the political offense exception to the Treaty. Al Zumar was re-
leased to Algeria. The decision was badly taken and also badly
timed since, two days later, Greece and the Justice Minister
hosted a meeting of the Trevi Group.' 4 Understandably,
Greece came under heavy criticism at that meeting for its deci-
sion.
Obviously, no amount of language tightening can prevent
such highhanded conduct. It should be equally obvious that
the level of trust between Italy and Greece in the area of ter-
rorism was badly damaged. While Greece may not have
wished to be viewed as a refuge for terrorists, in Italy it was
then believed that no extradition of a Middle Eastern terrorist
would prevail there, and it was felt that the terrorist states had
more diplomatic influence with Greece than Italy did.
In the area of mutual assistance in criminal matters, the
major problem which again arises is that the treaties and con-
ventions are designed to exchange information between na-
tional law enforcement organisms, when in fact, much of the
most valuable evidence is maintained by intelligence services.
Thus, the judicial and police officials of a particular country
may not have access to the information which they need in or-
der to pursue an investigation, let alone to turn it over to a
requesting country. Compliance with mutual assistance re-
quests may also be impeded by the requested nations' desire to
know the motivation for the request, and significant time is
often lost in an evaluation of whether release of the informa-
tion is in the requested nations' best interests. Similarly, nor-
mal police-to-police exchanges, which occur informally and
13. Diplomatic note is notification through an official government communica-
tion.
14. See Anti-Terror Unit to Talh Strategy, N.Y. Times, Dec. 9, 1988, at A14, col. 1;
supra note 6 (discussing Trevi Group).
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with great frequency and success in the areas of narcotics and
organized crime, are largely absent in the area of terrorism.
Here, even if the "judicial" police have the information and
want to exchange it, they find that its dissemination is re-
stricted, or that they do not have foreign colleagues or contacts
whom they know well enough to share it.
Similar problems exist at Interpol. Interpol, which should
be a leading proponent of international cooperation against
terrorism, is instead another victim of the lowest common de-
nominator syndrome of international organizations. Until
quite recently, Interpol did not accept requests for provisional
arrest in most terrorist cases, because the international mem-
bership had agreed that these were generally political matters.
As a result, nations seeking to apprehend terrorists proceeded
by sending diplomatic notes requesting provisional arrests.
Those notes, however, often stated that they were being trans-
mitted by diplomatic means because the charge was considered
(by Interpol) to be political in nature. Upon receipt of such a
message, most nations found it difficult not to deny the request
on the basis of the note itself. Although Interpol has now
agreed to transmit requests for arrest in terrorist offenses, they
still refuse "political" cases. Since many nations do not know
of Interpol's recent decision, and those which do often can not
tell which cases will be considered "political," they still do not
use Interpol. Finally, the Interpol channel is not secret: any
member (including Syria, Libya, Iraq and others) could learn
of arrest requests for particular fugitives. Consequently, In-
terpol is rarely used, and another important avenue of cooper-
ation has been largely foreclosed.
Self-Help
The Achille Lauro Affair
Given the difficulties inherent in the use of extradition and
mutual assistance process in terrorism, it is not surprising that
the United States has, in the last several years, resorted to
means of "self-help" to secure jurisdiction of terrorists di-
rectly. In one well-known example which occurred in October
1985 and involved an Italian cruise ship, the Achille Lauro, the
United States conducted a flawless military operation in which
U.S. fighters intercepted and forced down an Egyptian plane
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on which Abu Abbas and several terrorists who had hijacked
the Achille Lauro and killed one American passenger were leav-
ing Egypt. 5 The United States had for the previous several
days monitored conversations from the office of Egyptian Pres-
ident Mubarak, and learned that, contrary to his assurances,
the terrorists were still in Egypt and were about to depart on
an Egypt Air flight. 6 U.S. fighter planes were waiting in the air
off the coast of Egypt. 17 Acting on intelligence information,
they were looking for a particular identifying number on the
tail of the plane.' 8 They flew up to and checked dozens of out-
bound Egypt Air flights until they located the one on which the
hijackers were boarded.' 9 The fighters then intercepted the
plane and forced it to land at the Sigonella NATO base in Sic-
ily. 20
The United States was delighted with the success of this
operation, through which they were able to get their hands on
the terrorists and force them to a third country which they be-
lieved would be more receptive than Egypt to its request for
extradition. The operation, I might note, was directed by Oli-
ver North and John Poindexter, whose subsequent involve-
ment in other international affairs was less favorably received.
After having attained this tactical success, however, the United
States was confronted with serious political and legal
problems. Having forced the plane down in Italy, the country
with primary jurisdiction over the incident since its citizens and
its ship, the Achille Lauro, were involved,2' Italian authorities
15. Jenkins, The Achille Lauro Hiaching (A), Case Program C16-88-863.0, Ken-
nedy School of Government, Harvard University [hereinafter Achille Lauro Case Pro-
gram (A)]; see Miller, Hijackers Yield Ship in Egypt; Passenger Slain; 400 Are Safe; U.S.
Assails Deal With Captors, N.Y. Times, Oct. 10, 1985, at Al, col. 6.
16. Achille Lauro Case Program (A), supra note 15, at 18.
17. Id. at 19.
18. Id. at 20.
19. Id.
20. Gwertzman, U.S. Intercepts Jet Carrying Hijackers; Fighters Divert It To NATO Base
In Italy; Gunmen Face Trial In Slaying of Hostage, N.Y. Times, Oct. 11, 1985, at AI, col.
6; Briefing by National Security Advisor Robert McFarlane on the Apprehension of
the Achille Lauro Hijackers, Oct. 11, 1985, 24 I.L.M. 1516 (1985); Achille Lauro Case
Program (A), supra note 15, at 20.
21. See Achille Lauro Case Program (A), supra note 15, at 21 (quoting Oliver
Revell, FBI Executive Assistant Director for Investigations). Italy had primary juris-
diction over the offenses that were committed on the Achille Lauro under the law of
the flag. The United States sought jurisdiction based on the passive personality prin-
ciple, a lesser basis ofjurisdiction. See Note, The Passive Personality Principle and Its Use
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were compelled by their constitution to bring criminal action
against the perpetrators of the incident.2 2 That meant that the
fugitives other than Abu Abbas would remain in Italy to face
trial there. 3
At that time, however, Italy did not have charges against
Abu Abbas and, unless otherwise restrained, he would be
freed. The United States made an immediate request under
the new United States-Italy treaty on extradition for Abbas'
provisional arrest and restraint.24 Although that request satis-
fled all of the elements of the treaty and contained what the
United States believed was ample evidence to support the re-
quest, including an arrest warrant issued in the United States,
the Italian Justice Minister denied the request within six hours
of its presentation (on this occasion the United States had no
complaint about the promptness of Italy's reply).25 Although
the denial of that request is difficult to square with the terms of
the treaty, it is not difficult to understand why Italy acted as it
did.
Italy was advised that the United States had secured cus-
tody of the plane which the Achille Lauro defendants and Abu
Abbas were aboard only moments before the aircraft was
forced down on its territory.26 Italy felt that the United States
had forced it into a position of direct conflict with the PLO,
with whom Italy had traditionally maintained good relations
and with whom it had negotiated together with Egypt to secure
the release of the Achille Lauro.27 Ultimately, the Craxi govern-
ment decided to permit Abbas to leave Italy, and held the
in Combatting International Terrorism, 13 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 298 (1989-1990) (discuss-
ing issues of jurisdiction in international law).
22. See Jenkins, The Achille Lauro Hiacking (B), Case Program C16-88-864.0,
Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University, at 1 [hereinafter Achille Lauro
Case Program (B)].
23. See id. at 4-13.
24. Id. at 9-11.
25. Id. at 11. Italian Prime Minister Bettino Craxi later stated:
The request for the provisional arrest, though formally correct, did not, in
the Justice Minister's opinion, satisfy the factual and substantive require-
ments laid down by Italian law. This being so, there was no longer any legal
basis for detaining Abbas, since at the time he was on board an aircraft
which enjoyed extra-territorial status.
Id.
26. Achille Lauro Case Program (A), supra note 15, at 21-23.
27. Achille Lauro Case Program (B), supra note 22, at 12.
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other defendants.2 That decision was severely criticized both
in the United States and within Italy's coalition government,
which thereafter fell. 29
The Hamadei Case
On January 13, 1987, another terrorist, Mohammed
Hamadei, was arrested when he got off a plane in Frankfurt,
West Germany, with a suitcase full of high explosives. 30 The
United States had tracked Hamadei, learned of his trip, and
notified the West German police, who were waiting for him on
his arrival. Hamadei had participated in the hijacking of a
TWA flight bound from Athens to Rome and the execution of a
Navy seaman aboard that flight.3' The United States had al-
ready indicted Hamadei for his participation in the hijacking
and murder aboard the TWA flight, and immediately pursued
his extradition from Germany.32 The United States presented
its complete extradition request one week after Hamadei's
arrest. The request, which was translated into German, was
105 pages long and contained detailed evidence." As one
German Justice Ministry official later observed, "[the applica-
tion] was perfect under the formal requirements. There was
no legal reason not to have a quick decision. ' 34
There was no quick decision, however, because during
that same week following Hamadei's arrest, two German citi-
zens were kidnapped in Beirut and their captors sent a
28. Id. at 11-13.
29. See The U.S.-Italian Quarrel, N.Y. Times, Oct. 18, 1985, at A8, col. 5; see also
Achille Lauro Case Program (B), supra note 22, at 15-17. It should be noted that Abu
Abbas was subsequently prosecuted by Italian authorities in absentia. He was con-
victed and sentenced to life imprisonment, though he still remains at large. Id. at 18-
19. Despite Italy's subsequent recognition of Abbas' guilt in the Achille Lauro inci-
dent, the United States' unilateral action in bringing the Egyptian plane onto Italian
territory and Italy's release of Abbas have remained sore points between the nations.
30. Kennedy, The Extradition of Mohammed Hamadei, Case Program C 15-88-835.0,
Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University, at 1 [hereinafter Hamadei Case
Program].
31. Id.
32. Id.
33. Id. at 6. An official in the German Ministry's criminal law division stated that
[o]n the 20th ofJanuary, that means one week after arresting Hamadei, the
complete extradition request arrived .... That's quite exceptional ....
The request is enormous, it's 105 pages.
Id. (statement of Peter Wilkitzki).
34. Id.
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message stating that if Hamadei were extradited to the United
States, the hostages would be killed.35 The kidnapping of the
two German citizens in Beirut slowed the extradition process
to a standstill.
Ultimately, after six months, Germany rejected the U.S.
application for Hamadei's extradition and instead determined
to prosecute him in Germany on the U.S. charges.3 6 While
that alternative of prosecution rather than extradition was pro-
vided for by the treaty, the United States took the view that the
extradition request took precedence over local prosecution
under the treaty and should have been granted. The United
States was concerned that Germany would not have the same
interest in the matter that it did, since none of its citizens were
aboard the flight and none were killed. In principle, the extra-
dite or prosecute provision in treaties is not favored by the
United States since the country in which the terrorist is found
often has a significantly lesser interest in prosecuting the case,
and may have legal restrictions which would not apply in a
prosecution in the United States.
In Hamadei, the United States was also concerned that fear
for the welfare of its hostages could affect Germany's willing-
ness to prosecute the case fully. The United States therefore
made substantial efforts to ensure that its evidence was fully
presented and available to the German authorities, even
though this meant an extensive and expensive effort to present
witnesses and technical proof in Germany. The result of the
prosecution was that Hamadei was convicted and sentenced as
an adult for his crimes.37 While. there is no capital punishment
in Germany, which Hamadei would have faced in the United
States, he received a sentence of life imprisonment.38
Although this result was somewhat satisfying to U.S. authori-
ties, it fell far short of their goal to use the extradition treaty
for its primary purpose-the return of the criminal to the
35. Id. at 1.
36. Id. at 19-20. The Germany-United States extradition treaty followed the
principle "aut dedere aut iudicare"--either extradite or try. German law provided
for jurisdiction over Hamadei's offense based on the universality principle ofjurisdic-
tion. The universality principle provides for jurisdiction over certain serious crimes,
including hijacking. See Randall, Universal Jurisdiction Under International Law, 66
TExAs L. REV. 785 (1988).
37. Hamadei Case Program, supra note 30, at 20.
38. Id.
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United States for prosecution. The United States felt that,
once again, despite excellent success at apprehending a terror-
ist in a friendly nation, political considerations had prevailed
over treaty requirements.
The Yunis Case
Later that same year, in September 1987, special agents of
the FBI arrested a Lebanese terrorist named Fawaz Yunis. 9
This arrest, however, was planned and executed in international
waters in the Mediterranean. Yunis was sought for his involve-
ment in the 1985 hijacking and destruction of a Jordanian air-
liner at Beirut International Airport on which three U.S. citi-
zens had been passengers. 40 His arrest marked the first time
that the United States exercised its authority to try a defendant
under two anti-terrorist statutes enacted in 1984. 4'
Yunis had been persuaded to leave Beirut and go aboard a
yacht in the Mediterranean on the promise of a narcotics
deal.42 Following his arrest, Yunis was put aboard a U.S. Navy
vessel which sailed six days before reaching an aircraft carrier,
from which Yunis was flown to the United States.43 , In this in-
stance, Yunis' arrest presented no possibility that another na-
tion would reject his return to the United States. That, in the
view of many law enforcement officials, was the clear advan-
tage of this type of remedy.
Yunis' arrest, however, raised other problems, this time of
a legal nature. Thus, Yunis claimed that his arrest and trans-
port to the United States violated his constitutional rights.4 4
Although the arresting authorities had a warrant, Yunis
claimed that he was effectively kidnapped and held hostage
throughout the seven-day return to the United States, during
which he made statements which were used against him at
39. See Jenkins, Bringing Terror to Justice: The Extra-Territorial Arrest of Fawaz Yunis,
Case Program C96-90-960.0, Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University
[hereinafter Yunis Case Program]; United States v. Yunis, 681 F. Supp. 909, 912-15
(D.D.C.), rev'd, 859 F.2d 953 (D.C. Cir. 1988).
40. Yunis Case Program, supra note 39, at 1; United States v. Yunis, 681 F. Supp.
896, 899 (D.D.C. 1988), aff'd, 924 F.2d 1086 (D.C. Cir. 1991).
41. Hostage Taking Act of 1984, 18 U.S.C. § 1203 (1988); Aircraft Sabotage
Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 31-32 (1988).
42. Yunis Case Program, supra note 39, at 14; Yunis, 681 F. Supp. at 912-15.
43. Yunis Case Program, supra note 39, at 14-16; Yunis, 681 F. Supp. at 913-15.
44. Yunis, 681 F. Supp. at 911.
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trial.4" Yunis' claim was ultimately rejected under the Ker-Fris-
bie doctrine.46 Ker-Frisbie, which refers to two U.S. Supreme
Court cases, 47 essentially holds that U.S. courts will not ques-
tion the jurisdiction over an individual brought before it even
if his presence is obtained through illegal means, including
kidnapping. Although that doctrine has been modified some-
what by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit in
United States v. Toscanino48 and United States ex rel. Lujan v. Geng-
/er, 4 9 those cases merely hold that due process would be vio-
lated if the conduct of U.S. officials in bringing the individual
to its courts was so outrageous as to shock the conscience of
the court.50 Yunis' treatment at the time of his arrest and af-
terwards did not approach that standard, and his applications
to dismiss the indictment were denied.5"
Yunis also raised an objection that his appearance before
the U.S. court was not proper because his extradition had not
been requested.52 Although that claim was also denied by the
court, in reality it was not well founded, since no treaty exists
between the United States and Lebanon, and even if it did,
there was no governmental authority in that state to whom an
extradition proceeding could have been advanced. Neverthe-
less, this issue is a significant one which might be more effec-
tively presented in other circumstances in the future.
Post-Yunis Developments
Relying on Yunis and on an analysis of the Ker-Frisbie doc-
trine, the United States subsequently reconsidered the ques-
tion of whether it was legal to effect the arrest of individuals,
not solely terrorists, who were outside the United States, with-
45. Id.
46. United States v. Yunis, 859 F.2d 953 (D.C. Cir. 1988).
47. See Ker v. Illinois, 119 U.S. 436 (1886); Frisbie v. Collins, 342 U.S. 519
(1952).
48. 500 F.2d 267, reh'g denied, 504 F.2d 1380 (2d Cir. 1974), motion to dismiss
denied on remand, 398 F. Supp. 916 (E.D.N.Y. 1975).
49. 510 F.2d 62 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 1000 (1975).
50. For a discussion of the abduction issue in U.S. courts, see Note, The U.S.
Courts and the Treatment of Suspects Abducted Abroad Under International Law, 13 FORDHAM
INT'L L.J. 705 (1989-1990).
51. See Yunis, 681 F. Supp. at 918-21. But see Abramovsky, Extraterritorial Jurisdic-
tion: The United States Unwarranted Attempt to Alter International Law in United States v.
Yunis, 15 YALEJ. INT'L L. 121 (Winter 1990).
52. Yunis, 681 F. Supp. at 915-16.
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out resort to formal extradition. 3 The opinion concluded that
U.S. courts would not be deprived ofjurisdiction in such cases.
Although that opinion is not, and was not intended to act as, a
license for U.S. authorities to effect arrests overseas, in two re-
cent cases involving narcotics fugitives, U.S. law enforcement
agents, operating together with their foreign counterparts,
have arrested narcotics fugitives and returned them to the
United States without seeking their extradition. In these cases,
United States v. Matta-Ballesteros5 4 and United States v. Verdugo- Ur-
quidez,15 the local authorities did not protest U.S. actions.
Rather, they tacitly agreed with, and supported the apprehen-
sion of, those individuals and their return to the United States.
However, the extension of self-help remedies of arrest in-
side the borders of other countries with whom the United
States has extradition treaties raises serious policy issues, if not
serious legal issues. I say this because in both Matta-Ballesteros
and Verdugo-Urquidez, the prosecutions of the individuals were
successful, and in Verdugo-Urquidez, the U.S. Supreme Court
also permitted the use of evidence obtained in a search of his
residence conducted in Mexico by U.S. agents.56 However, the
policy issue which is raised by these cases remains trouble-
some. While it is easy to understand why our authorities
would be frustrated with efforts to use extradition treaties in
the case of terrorists and high level narcotics fugitives, the cir-
cumvention of those treaties is unlikely to provide any better
mechanism, and could create significant problems.
CONCLUSION
The efforts at developing methods and means of effective
international cooperation in combatting terrorism are still in a
formative stage. There is much to be learned and applied from
the successes which have been obtained in the fields of narcot-
ics trafficking and organized crime. Still, the problems which
53. See Lewis, U.S. Officials Clash at Hearing on Power to Seize Fugitives, N.Y. Times,
Nov. 9, 1989, at AI0, col. 3.
54. No. 86-00511 -RV (N.D. Fla.).
55. No. 86-0107 (Crim.) (S.D. Cal.).
56. See United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 110 S. Ct. 1056 (1990); see also Com-
ment, United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez: Restricting the Borders of the Fourth Amend-
ment, 14 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 267 (1990-1991) (analyzing Supreme Court's decision in
Verdugo-Urquidez).
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confront those seeking to enhance cooperation in the field of
terrorism are more difficult and complex. The frustrations
which follow from failed efforts at extradition following suc-
cessful apprehensions are understandable. However, even
though U.S. law permits the overseas arrest, indeed kidnap-
ping, of fugitives, I think the United States should be wary of
using this method even in frustrating circumstances. Circum-
vention of our treaties reduces trust on the part of our allies
and fosters the belief that the treaties themselves lack signifi-
cance. I believe that the best interests of the United States lie
in developing its relations with its allies and strengthening its
use of legal means, including extradition and mutual assist-
ance. The development of those relations and the enhance-
ment of those tools should be our primary interest, if we are to
forge cooperative channels which will grow and endure in the
future.
